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Abstract 
Critical scholars have long examined the ways in which identity categories are forcibly 
written upon bodies through the functioning of social norms. For many marginalized groups, 
such critiques have been central to challenging pathologising understandings of identity 
categories, often by uncoupling bodies from identities. Yet despite this, normative accounts 
of embodiment are still forcibly written upon the bodies of many groups of people, albeit 
often in mundane ways. Nowhere is this perhaps more evident than in the lives of trans 
people. This paper explores one instance of this by examining in close detail some of the key 
discursive strategies deployed by Oprah Winfrey in her first interview with Thomas Beatie. It 
is argued that Beatie is constantly drawn into a logic of ‘bodily evidence’ that demands of 
him an aetiological account of himself as a man, and from which, Winfrey concludes, he is 
always left lacking.  
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There now exists a considerable body of attitudinal research examining beliefs about lesbians 
and gay men held amongst the general population (see chapters in Pardie and Luchetta, 1999, 
for a summary). There also exists a considerable body of discursive research that has mapped 
the ways in which discrimination against lesbians and gay men occurs in everyday 
interactions, and the particular rhetorical devices that are deployed to this end (see, for 
example, Land and Kitzinger, 2005; Speer and Potter, 2000). An excellent example of such 
discursive research appears in the work of Elizabeth Peel (2001), who coined the term 
‘mundane heterosexism’ to refer to the commonplace (though no less violent) ways in which 
discrimination against lesbians and gay men often passes by under the guise of humour or 
claims to liberalism. A second important example of research in the discursive tradition is 
provided by Virginia Braun (2000), who suggests that heterosexism can occur either by 
commission (the explicit voicing of heterosexist comments) or by omission (the failure to 
challenge heterosexism).  
Yet whilst these bodies of research (attitudinal and discursive) have contributed much 
to our knowledge of discrimination against lesbians and gay men, they have not yet 
contributed as much to our understanding of the general population’s attitudes towards trans 
people, or the everyday ways in which discrimination against trans people occurs in 
conversation. Whilst of course there is a growing body of research on the explicit 
discrimination that trans people face (e.g., Couch et al., 2008; Whittle et al., 2007), there has 
to date been less published on how and why such discrimination occurs. Exceptions to this 
are the development and limited application of a scale designed to measure attitudes toward 
trans people amongst the general population (Hill and Willoughby, 2005), a UK study of 
attitudes towards trans people (Tee and Hegarty, 2006) and some discursive research on the 
gatekeeping of medical support in transitioning amongst psychiatrists (Speer, 2006). This 
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paper seeks to contribute to this burgeoning latter body of research by analysing one 
particular instance of discrimination against one trans person: an interview with trans man 
Thomas Beatie conducted by Oprah Winfrey. In so doing, this paper documents how such 
discrimination occurs in mundane (though again no less violent) ways.  
As many readers may be aware, Beatie came under the gaze of the international media 
when, in 2008, he and his wife announced that he was pregnant and carrying their baby. As 
the media sensationalism slowly turned to a calmer presentation of the ‘facts’, and as Beatie 
gave interviews telling his own story, debates arose over whether Beatie was indeed a 
pregnant man, or whether his status as a man was questioned by the very fact of his 
pregnancy. The Oprah Winfrey interview marked the beginning of the uptake of the story 
within the ‘respectable’ (as opposed to tabloid) media, and as such is an important site to 
examine for the ways in which a broad spectrum of the viewing public was presented with a 
very specific version of Beatie and his story. More specifically, and as is the focus here, the 
interview evidences a number of instances where what is termed here ‘mundane transphobia’ 
was enacted by Winfrey in the interview. As such, the analysis presented here focuses on the 
rhetorical effects of Winfrey’s statements, with an emphasis upon what is implied by many of 
her claims about Beatie’s embodiment and identity. In this sense, and whilst not a full 
discourse analysis of the interview (in that the analysis doesn’t attend in any depth to the 
broader social representation of trans men, nor does it focus very closely on the interactional 
nature of the interview as data but rather primarily on Winfrey’s comments), the analysis 
presented below nonetheless highlights how Winfrey’s engagement with Beatie enacts a 
range of marginalising tropes about trans men that must be clearly identified in order to be 
challenged. 
In regards to the term ‘mundane transphobia’, whilst it is acknowledged that Peel’s 
(2001) analysis of mundane heterosexism focused on everyday interactions in which 
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heterosexism occurs, and whilst the Oprah Winfrey interview with Thomas Beatie might be 
seen as somewhat outside of the everyday, it is nonetheless suggested here that the point of 
similarity is that in both Peel’s work and the present paper, it is the banal, indeed routine, 
ways in which normative assumptions are made that makes heterosexism and transphobia 
both speakable and difficult to challenge. Comment is also warranted here on the use of the 
word ‘transphobia’. Feminist scholars writing from within and against psychology have long 
critiqued the individualising and minimising effects of the term ‘homophobia’ (e.g., Kitzinger 
and Perkins, 1993), suggesting that it fails to capture the systemic nature of anti-gay 
discrimination, and that this is because it locates such discrimination as a ‘phobia’ within the 
minds of individual people. A similar argument could of course be made for the term 
‘transphobia’. The term is retained in this paper, however, for the powerful rhetorical effect it 
has: when most people think of transphobia they are likely to think of the murders of trans 
people motivated by hate for people who do not conform to a normative model of gender. 
Whilst putting the speech of Oprah Winfrey in the same category may seem extreme, there is 
considerable utility in demonstrating how marginalising speech, hate speech, and murder sit 
on the same continuum; one that is shaped by normative gender binaries as they relate to 
embodiment. 
Before moving on to analyse the transcript of the interview, it is important to first 
provide a few remarks about the broader context in which this paper sits. As Butler (2004) 
has suggested, there is a now longstanding tradition of academic writing which, in effect, 
uses the lives of trans people to demonstrate the constructed nature of gendered categories. 
Beginning with the work of Garfinkel (1967) in his now (in)famous work on Agnes (a trans 
woman), what is constructed as the ‘choice’ or ‘ability’ of trans people to ‘change gender’ 
has been treated as an ethnographic site useful for examining how gender norms are 
constructed and perpetuated. Importantly, almost all of this research has been conducted by 
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people who do not identify as trans, a fact that at least in part must render this research to 
some degree suspect for the way in which it takes the lives of a marginalised group of people 
as valid ‘evidence’ for claims made by dominant group members (i.e., non-trans people). It is 
only more recently that research (led in many instances by trans people) has shifted to 
examine the resistances that trans people make to transphobia (e.g., Couch et al., 2008; 
Sakamoto et al., 2009); the families that trans people create (e.g., Hines, 2006); and the 
sexual identities of trans people (e.g., Devor, 1993). This shift is important, and marks a 
move away from the treatment of trans people as objects of research, and towards one where 
trans people are seen as active subjects in the determination of what is considered to be valid 
research about their lives.  
With these above points in mind, it is important to state here that I do not identify as 
trans. What I do identify as, however, and the place from which I speak, is as a white middle-
class gay man with a research interest in discursive analyses of how discrimination occurs in 
very mundane ways. In this sense, my intent in writing this article is not to hold Beatie up as 
a tool in my own agenda to make a point about gender through examining the life of a trans 
person, nor is it to speak for trans people. Rather, my point is to examine how Winfrey makes 
use of a range of gender normative (and indeed offensive) arguments that position Beatie as 
‘not quite’ – not quite a father, not quite a man, and thus not quite intelligible. Whilst it 
should be stated here that across the interview Winfrey’s talk may be viewed as broadly 
supportive of Beatie and his family, in the specific quite another picture emerges, one in 
which Winfrey appears unable to accept as legitimate Beatie’s identity as a man and his 
pregnancy. Importantly, it must also be stated here that Beatie himself is not entirely outside 
gender normativity, as can be seen in some of his own statements. Trans people’s own 
imbrication within gender normativity, however, must be the focus of a separate paper, with 
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the focus of the present paper being upon the enactment of mundane transphobia towards 
trans people by non-trans people. 
 
Analytic Approach 
 
Transcripts for the Oprah Winfrey Show are available to download for a fee from 
www.oprah.com. I downloaded the transcript of the interview between Winfrey and Beatie in 
August 2007, two months after the interview aired, in addition to having recorded the 
interview when it aired. I then viewed the video recording along with the transcript multiple 
times, in order to identify the dominant ways in which Winfrey engaged with and constructed 
Beatie. As such I adopted an inductive approach to examining the transcripts, given there was 
little previous discursive research examining how non-trans people speak to transgender 
people, and also because I had no a priori assumption that Winfrey would make transphobic 
statements in the interview (rather my interest was in how Beatie was being represented). My 
viewing process was iterative, in that with each successive viewing I identified particular 
salient features in terms of the representation of Beatie by Winfrey, and then re-viewed these 
to assess whether or not they could legitimately be seen as part of a consistent narrative 
occurring across the interview. In this sense my analysis approximated Wetherell and Potter’s 
(1992) approach to the analysis of interpretative repertoires. As they note, interpretative 
repertoires are “broadly discernable clusters of terms, descriptions and figures of speech often 
assembled around metaphors or vivid images” (90). As such, identifying and examining 
interpretative repertoires is “a way of understanding the content of discourse and how that 
content is organized” (original emphasis, 90). Thus in the context of the present paper, whilst 
the overall discourse to be examined is one of mundane transphobia – the everyday ways in 
which non-trans people enact marginalisation towards transgender people despite claims to 
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inclusivity – it is in the interpretative repertoires identified that we can see just how this 
discourse is deployed. From my iterative analysis of the transcript I identified two distinct 
interpretative repertoires. These were 1) a focus on the (contested) aetiology of Beatie’s 
identity as a man, and 2) the evocation of a highly gender normative account of masculinity.  
 
Analysis 
 
In the analysis that follows, I examine the two interpretative repertoires identified, and I pay 
close attention to the rhetorical logic employed to justify the statements made by Winfrey to 
Beatie, and hence to pass them off as not being transphobic. As my analysis demonstrates, 
regardless of the intent of Winfrey, the statements examined here are transphobic precisely 
because they accept as ‘normal’ forms of embodiment where natally-assigned sex accords 
with gender identity, and hence fail to truly apprehend Beatie as a man on his own terms. 
 
Aetiology and Evidence 
 
In his incisive re-analysis of Garfinkel’s (1967) reporting of his work with Agnes, Denzin 
(1991) suggests that Garfinkel’s work displays a “masculine preoccupation with theorizing 
the genesis, origins, causes and effects of various social situations, including social problems 
and the types of persons and groups who have or who are those problems” (198). Denzin 
outlines Garfinkel’s apparent obsession with legitimating his claims about gender through a 
focus on the aspects of Agnes’ embodiment that he constructs as mattering. As such, Agnes’ 
body is made to matter on terms that are highly prescribed by existing gender norms at the 
time (where, for example, women were – and potentially still are – expected to be feminine 
and well presented and demure). That Garfinkel went on to claim from the ‘facts’ of Agnes’ 
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embodiment a theory of gender as a situational and conversational enactment thus 
demonstrates the circuitous logic he employed, whereby a normative performance of gender 
served to legitimate a normative gender order (even as Garfinkel claimed to show that gender 
can be changed). In other words, whilst Garfinkel argued for the contextual and changeable 
nature of gender, there were still only two options for gender expression, and these were 
clearly marked by a set of normative and limiting behaviours. Garfinkel’s reliance upon an 
aetiological account of Agnes’ life thus did little if anything to actually recognise Agnes’ own 
experiences of embodiment, and instead forced them into a framework in which she was 
rendered intelligible via a very particular evidentiary pathway that upheld Garfinkel’s 
theories about the world, a practice that unfortunately occurs far too often in the social 
sciences.  
In very similar ways, Winfrey constructs an account within her interview with Beatie 
that proposes a aetiology for his life that upholds a normative account of gender wherein 
there are either men or women, and that even if some men have vaginas or some women have 
penises, they were always originally a ‘matched pair’ (within a logic where penises belong to 
males and vaginas belong to females). Winfrey’s emphasis upon aetiology is evident from the 
beginning of the interview, such as in this first extract taken from the opening few minutes of 
the interview: 
 
WINFREY: So, I know the first question, because we didn't tell our audience is how is this [a 
pregnant man] possible? And we're going to get into that in a minute, but first let's go back to 
the very beginning. Thomas was actually born Tracy. 
AUDIENCE: Ah. 
WINFREY: Okay. Because you all are going, "Okay." 
WINFREY: So, tell us about that. Tell us about that. 
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BEATIE: Where do I start? I've -- 
WINFREY: Growing up you felt that you were--I know your mother died when you were -- 
BEATIE: When I was 12 years old. 
WINFREY: Twelve years old and that's a great loss for anybody. So as a 12-year old little 
girl, your mom died and you were basically left with not a lot of feminine images, correct? 
 
Here Winfrey constructs, with very little help from Beatie, an account of the ‘causes’ of 
Beatie now being a pregnant man. Her aetiological account is signalled in her use of the 
words ‘the very beginning’, which denote to the audience that the information she is 
providing references Beatie’s ‘natural’ or natal state of being – that of being Tracy. Much like 
the logic employed by Garfinkel, the fact that Beatie was born with a vagina is taken as 
appropriately leading to him being given a girl’s name (hence Thomas was actually born 
Tracy). When the audience affirms this as an acceptable explanation of how it is that Beatie is 
a pregnant man, Winfrey is affirmed in continuing with an aetiological ‘explanation’ of 
Beatie. Whilst Winfrey then invites Beatie to tell his story, she almost immediately cuts in 
and takes over the telling of the story, in which she emphasises a causal explanation for his 
current identification and embodiment, rather than allowing him to tell the story of his life. 
Having introduced the death of Beatie’s mother when he was twelve, and again with very 
little input from Beatie, Winfrey is then able to create a link between the loss of a mother 
(who is presumed to be feminine) and Beatie’s current gender identification. And again, in 
the final sentence Winfrey reiterates that Beatie was ‘a 12-year old little girl’, thus 
reinforcing the ‘once was girl, now man’ logic that maps out a trajectory of gender 
identification from one gender to ‘the other’.  
With this as the framework, then, the audience is provided with an introduction to 
Beatie and his life that is not only very narrow and focused upon aetiology, but is also 
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transphobic for the particularly limited account of Beatie’s experiences as masculine that it 
allows (something he reports as a lifelong experience throughout the interview). Indeed, as 
we can see in the following extract, at the same time as Beatie attempts to account for 
masculinity as the norm for him as a person, rather than as a sudden change, Winfrey remains 
wedded to an aetiological account whereby first there was Tracy, and then there was Thomas: 
 
BEATIE: Up until puberty, I didn't see anything wrong at all. When I turned, I think it was 
about 14, I started to grow breasts and I thought – 
WINFREY: We all do, some earlier than others. It was 11 for me, but anyway, go ahead. 
BEATIE: Well, it was kind of a shock to me, because I didn't have my mother around and, 
you know, I was just used to catching footballs and, you know, balls and so it hurt and I just 
kind of thought, you know, "What's my body going through?" You know, "Is it betraying 
me?" And my father, he pushed me into modeling... 
WINFREY: Yeah. 
BEATIE: ...at the time. 
WINFREY: Weren't you Miss Teen Hawaii? Or in a pageant? 
BEATIE: Well, I was in a pageant. I was Miss Teen Hawaii USA finalist. 
AUDIENCE: Wow. 
WINFREY: Yeah. And what do you think when you see those pictures now? 
BEATIE: Well, I think that's an attractive woman. 
WINFREY: Mm-hmm. 
BEATIE: Yeah, definitely. I just--I wish I felt comfortable looking like that. I don't feel like I 
was born in the wrong body. I felt like I was meant to be exactly who I am today. 
WINFREY: Mm-hmm. 
BEATIE: And, yeah, it's kind of hard to explain. I mean, you want to ask me? 
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WINFREY: Did you have boyfriends? 
BEATIE: I did have boyfriends. I had a couple of boyfriends. 
WINFREY: Looking like that I would say you probably did. 
 
In this extract Beatie is invited to account for when he came to recognise that his body didn’t 
match with his sense of self. Having introduced the topic of breasts, Winfrey is able to locate 
both herself and Beatie on a shared ground – as females – in her statement that ‘we all do’. In 
this statement Oprah, as a woman, positions herself on a common ground with Beatie who 
thus, by default, is also positioned as being a woman, even if this is in reference to the 
teenage version of Beatie. This type of statement is mundane transphobia at its most obvious, 
where Beatie not only identifies himself as a man in the interview, but also suggests that 
despite what his ‘body was going through’, he still saw himself as engaged in what he depicts 
as (albeit normative) masculine pursuits (i.e., catching footballs). Yet despite this, Winfrey 
persists in providing an account of Beatie not simply as being once a female, but implicitly as 
always and ongoingly a female. Thus rather than acknowledging Beatie’s own identification 
as always being a person with a vagina and an ‘attractive’ body who regardless had a 
masculine sense of self, Winfrey appears invested in emphasising a normative account of 
gender identity and embodiment whereby being an attractive woman (who enters beauty 
pageants and who ‘looking like that I would say probably did’ have boyfriends) becomes the 
central focus of Winfrey’s narration of Beatie’s life. This is all despite the fact that Beatie 
clearly invites Winfrey to talk with him about his statement that ‘I was meant to be exactly 
who I am today’, to which Winfrey responds by asking about boyfriends, rather than about 
Beatie’s experiences of embodiment as a man. Again, this reduces Beatie’s account to a 
teleological understanding of his identification whereby Tracy always already precedes 
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Thomas, and furthermore whereby Tracy is as much a part of Thomas’ present as she is his 
past. 
Following Butler (2004), then, we might suggest that Beatie is subjected to a 
regulatory apparatus (i.e., gender) in order to be recognised, and yet the apparatus 
(constructed as it is through a set of binary oppositions that function within a normative 
framework) fails to actually apprehend him as the person he is. In other words, whilst 
Winfrey attempts to render Beatie intelligible within a gendered system as a man with a 
womb who was once a beauty queen, her enactments of mundane transphobia only serve to 
position Beatie as unintelligible precisely because of an aetiological account that locates him 
as a failure in terms of orienting to a gender that corresponds with his body. By Winfrey’s 
logic, it would potentially be acceptable for him to be a man without a penis (and without a 
womb and thus not pregnant), or to be a woman with a womb, but not to be a pregnant man. 
This logic is further evidenced when Beatie’s wife states, “It wasn't a difficult decision [for 
Beatie to carry the child], because I can't have children. I had endometriosis and so they 
removed my womb. So, I have no womb. Therefore, he does, and we, this is the way we’re 
going to do it”. So here we have a woman without a womb, but who is treated as a woman as 
her history tells that she was always a woman. Yet Beatie, as a man with a womb able to bear 
a child (but who has a ‘history’ of being in a teen beauty pageant and having boyfriends) 
cannot be a pregnant man, but must be something else altogether that Winfrey cannot 
comprehend.  
One potentially dangerous knock on effect of the transphobia inherent to Winfrey’s 
talk is the implications for Beatie (and his wife) as parent-to-be. If, as Butler (2004) argues, 
approval for breast removal for trans men is contingent upon ‘proof’ of longstanding 
unhappiness with the fact of having breasts, then Beatie’s reports not only of being ‘not being 
born in the wrong body’ but also of being comfortable with who he is (i.e., a man with a 
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womb) potentially jeopardise his situation as a trans man dependent upon a very tenuous 
position within a medicalised hierarchy whereby it is the role of ‘professionals’ to determine 
who qualifies as a ‘real’ trans person, professionals who can revoke that approval at any time 
(Armitage 2001). As a parent, and as one subject to the medicalising gaze both as a pregnant 
person and as a trans person, Beatie is thus vulnerable to the societal reliance upon medicine 
and the psy disciplines as appropriate arbiters for what counts as acceptable parenting. We 
can see this in the following extract, in which Winfrey invited Beatie’s ob/gyn to comment on 
his pregnancy: 
 
WINFREY: Well, Dr. James, are there risks with Thomas's pregnancy? I mean, among other 
things, this is the first man I've heard about and I think "People Magazine's" heard about. All 
that testosterone he was taking before that got him the beard and allows him to look in the 
mirror and shave every morning, and whatever else testosterone does for you, could that hurt 
the baby? 
OB/GYN: Thomas has obviously done a lot of research on this, too, as well, and is very 
intelligent about it. He's been off testosterone for two years, before even trying to conceive. 
And so at this time his testosterone levels are normal. Obviously, there's changes that have 
been made physically that are permanent changes for him, but as far as hormone levels, his 
hormone levels are normal. This is a normal pregnancy. You know, people say "Oh, is this 
baby going to be abnormal or anything like that?" This baby's totally healthy. This I consider, 
you know, an average pregnancy. 
 
The first point to be noted about this extract is the very existence of it in terms of who is 
being interviewed. That Winfrey is speaking to a medical professional about what is for all 
intents and purposes a ‘normal pregnancy’ implicitly suggests that in fact the pregnancy is 
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not normal, and thus it requires comment from a professional. This is signalled most clearly 
in the language of risk that is introduced by Winfrey’s question of whether testosterone could 
‘hurt the baby’. This question shifts the focus away from Beatie, and towards the baby, about 
whom Winfrey appears primarily concerned. Whilst the ob/gyn responds by providing an 
affirming depiction of Beatie as ‘very intelligent’ in regards to his decision to carry a child, 
her recourse to notions of ‘normal’ subtly work to reiterate the idea that Beatie is not per se a 
pregnant man, but rather a pregnant woman. To elaborate: If Beatie is, in Winfrey’s words, 
the ‘first [pregnant] man I’ve heard about and I think ‘People Magazine’s heard about’, then 
it is highly unlikely that there would be an established norm for what ‘normal’ hormone 
levels would look like for a pregnant man, or what an ‘average pregnancy’ would be for a 
pregnant man. The only way in which these words make sense is if they reference an average 
pregnancy for a woman.  
The only other way in which the words can be treated, and in the context of the 
statement ‘this baby’s totally healthy’, is that it is an average pregnancy for a baby, and the 
hormone levels are average for a baby. This account, whilst potentially less transphobic in its 
account of the pregnancy, is nonetheless still negative in the way it ignores Beatie as a human 
being, thus sidelining what might be best for him as a man in relation to hormone levels, or 
the challenges to him experiencing pregnancy as a man. This type of treatment of pregnant 
people is, of course, nothing new, with pregnant women typically expected to sacrifice their 
own needs or potentially even wellbeing to the needs of the growing foetus. Yet whilst this is 
true, what again makes the statements of the ob/gyn transphobic (in addition to being 
marginalising of Beatie as a pregnant person more generally) is the fact of the implicit 
comparison of Beatie’s pregnancy to the pregnancies of women. 
In this section I have argued that transphobia plays out in the interview via a series of 
normative assumptions about gender that are reliant upon an aetiological account of Beatie’s 
	   15 
life, and which render him only intelligible via a teleological account where he is positioned 
as ‘once a female, now sort of a male’. Yet, as I will argue further in the following section, 
this tentative apportioning of maleness to Beatie is also repeatedly undermined throughout 
the interview, thus rendering his identity as a pregnant man potentially unintelligible to the 
viewing audience 
 
‘Real men’, ‘real fathers’ 
 
In her analysis of the experiences of trans men who undertake pregnancy, Ryan (2009) 
suggests that “pregnant men are culturally unrecognizable” (145). This is not only the case 
because of the aforementioned normative status of a gender binary in which only women are 
presumed to have wombs, and only men are presumed to have penises, but also because the 
attributes associated with pregnancy and childbirth (i.e., a ‘maternal instinct’) are presumed 
to co-exist only within a body that is not only physically marked as female, but also 
psychologically marked as female.  In this sense, and through the reliance upon an 
aetiological account and via an emphasis upon Beatie’s supposedly limited markers of 
masculinity (and his accompanying clear markers of what is presumed to be femininity – i.e., 
his pregnancy), Beatie is constructed in the interview not simply as a ‘wannabe’ man, but 
moreover as a failed wannabe man. This can be seen in the following extract, where Winfrey 
challenges Beatie for his non-gender normative account of gender: 
 
BEATIE: And I realized that I wanted to be free again like I was when I was younger, when I 
didn't see the world as male or female. I just wanted to be myself and so I -- 
WINFREY: But the world is male and female. 
BEATIE: It is. 
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WINFREY: Okay. 
BEATIE: But for me, I'm a masculine person  
 
Here Winfrey calls Beatie to account for his ‘gender free’ version of the world, where she not 
only treats his statement as idealistic and out of touch with ‘reality’ (‘but the world is male 
and female’), but she also treats Beatie’s response (‘okay’ to ‘it is’) as mandatory. In other 
words, Winfrey appears to imply that whilst it is one thing to claim to be a man who is 
pregnant (even if, as the previous section suggested, that is treated as questionable), it is 
another thing entirely to claim as a trans man that gender categories don’t really matter. The 
implicit statement in this type of logic, then, is that for men whose masculinity is positioned 
as being under threat (i.e., due to being born without a penis), issues of masculinity should be 
at the centre of their world, not choosing to become pregnant and question gender binaries. 
Thus as Butler (2004) suggests in relation to trans people in general, trans people are 
constructed as failures when they do not “conform to a certain dominant fantasy of what 
existing norms actually are” (77). Indeed, it may be suggested, the construction of trans men 
such as Beatie as failures may be seen as integral to upholding this dominant fantasy whereby 
it is Beatie who is seen as a failure, not existing norms themselves (Riggs, 2005).  
Despite the implicit construction of Beatie as a failed man, Winfrey still devotes a 
considerable proportion of the interview to constructing an image of Beatie as at least a 
somewhat successful representation of a man. On two separate occasions she raises the topic 
of Beatie’s penis, as can be seen in the following two extracts in this paper: 
 
WINFREY: Okay. Now let's get to the penis part. 
BEATIE: Okay. Okay. What would you like to know? 
WINFREY: Everything. 
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WINFREY: No, really. So did you have like implant surgery or? 
BEATIE: I actually opted not to do anything to my reproductive organs, because I wanted to 
have a child one day. I didn't know how. It was just a dream. You know, there was no plan 
laid out but, you know, we had a lot of different options and I wasn't going to go there. 
OPRAH: Now, so that's so interesting to me, because you wanted to have a child one day and 
yet you also felt like you were a man. In feeling like you're a man, men don't have, you know, 
don't reproduce through their bodies, children, obviously. 
THOMAS: Correct, typically. 
WINFREY: Typically. I mean typically, yeah. Until now. So was that a conflict in your 
mind? 
BEATIE: You know, I have a very stable male gender identity. 
WINFREY: Mm-hmm. 
BEATIE: I see pregnancy as a process and it doesn't define who I am. 
 
 In response to Beatie’s claim that he chose to retain his (nominally female) reproductive 
organs with the dream of “hav[ing] a child one day”, Winfrey appears to struggle with this 
idea that Beatie could be a man who desired to “reproduce through [his] body”. It is 
important to note here Beatie’s implicit correction of Winfrey in his clarification of 
‘typically’ – that whilst most men do not reproduce through pregnancy in their own bodies, 
some can and do. Yet despite this clarification by Beatie, Winfrey still uses the suggestion of 
‘conflict’ through which to frame her response, and thus to some degree to contradict 
Beatie’s claims to a ‘very stable male gender identity’ (as can be seen in her noncommittal 
response of ‘Mm-hmm’). Beatie and Winfrey then go on to talk about other topics related to 
his transition, and Winfrey then again returns to the topic of penises: 
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WINFREY: Yes, you do have that right. So I was asking the question about 
your genitals. Did you have like a penis implant or you did something else? 
BEATIE: No. Amazingly, hormones are an incredible thing. 
Testosterone, you know in the womb up until I think two months we all look the same. Our 
genitals look the same. 
WINFREY: Yeah, that's true. 
BEATIE: And when testosterone is introduced -- 
WINFREY: You all know that, right? [to audience] You've seen the --yeah. You didn't 
know that? Yeah, we do. Okay. Go look at a little ultra-sound picture. Yeah. 
BEATIE: So when testosterone is introduced, that's when male genitalia starts to form and 
reproductive organs and I just, you know -- 
WINFREY: Meaning, does it grow testicles? I don't mean to -- 
BEATIE: Well, in the womb. 
WINFREY: I don't mean to be ignorant but does--do you, like, grow testicles too? 
BEATIE: No. I mean, I just introduced testosterone to my body a little later. 
WINFREY: yeah 
BEATIE: so the body had already formed to a certain point but certain changes do happen 
when you take testosterone. 
WINFREY: And then does the clitoris get larger? 
BEATIE It does. 
WINFREY: Yeah. 
BEATIE: And it looks like a penis, looks like a small penis. 
WINFREY: Yeah. 
BEATIE: Does size matter? 
WINFREY: Yeah. Well, to some people, yes. 
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BEATIE: I don't know. You can ask my wife that question. 
WINFREY: Okay. So it means that you just basically, your clitoris grows. It looks like a 
small penis and, therefore, you look like a man. 
BEATIE: Yes. And I can have intercourse with my wife. 
WINFREY: Intercourse. 
BEATIE: Mm-hmm. 
 
This extract opens up with Winfrey asking a question that she already had an answer to in the 
previous extract, namely whether or not Beatie had an ‘implant’. As the extract continues, it 
becomes evident that Winfrey is using standard rhetorical interview techniques to elicit a 
response from an interviewee, the answer to which she already knows. So, for example, 
Winfrey leaps from “I don’t mean to be ignorant” in one moment, to stating summarily that 
“basically your clitoris grows. It looks like a small penis”. In so doing, Winfrey is able to 
assert herself as a capable holder of knowledge about the lives and bodies of trans men, 
which then allows her to question some of Beatie’s claims. Most significantly in this extract, 
however, is Winfrey’s extrapolation that it is only with his ‘small penis’ that Beatie ‘looks 
like a man’. It is only by affirming the existence of something that Winfrey (and it could be 
argued, society more broadly) treats as evidence of maleness, that the final piece of the 
aetiology of Beatie’s identity as a pregnant man falls into place. The fact that Beatie not only 
has a penis (however small), and can have intercourse with his wife, is the lynchpin of the 
interview, whereby what is required of Beatie throughout is proof for his claim that he is a 
man (albeit one with a womb), and that he should be treated as such, rather than as a woman 
playing dress-ups.  
Of course Beatie’s masculinity is not allowed to simply stand even with the 
establishment of a penis. Instead, Winfrey remarks that “to some people” size does matter, 
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hence indicating that for some people Beatie is less of a man, if he is recognised as one at all. 
As a result of this statement (and importantly this occurs at precisely the very moment when 
Beatie is established as a man), his masculinity is thrown into question, thus upholding the 
logic outlined earlier where he is depicted as ‘not quite’ a man, and thus not quite a father, 
and not really a pregnant man. As the interview draws to a close, then, Beatie is left as a 
person without breasts but with a womb, as able to penetrate his wife with his ‘small’ penis 
but as carrying their baby. In this way, mundane transphobia operates to render Beatie 
relatively unintelligible within normative gender categories, and thus to perpetuate the 
marginalisation that his family faces. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this paper I have argued that mundane transphobia operates not simply to 
perpetuate discrimination against trans people, but more significantly to render trans people 
unintelligible, or at best intelligible only in particular narrow ways. This argument echoes 
those made by Braun (2000) and Peel (2001) in their discussions of heterosexism, in that 
whilst implied or ‘unintended’ discrimination may be perceived by some as less injurious, in 
fact it draws upon the very same normative assumptions as do more explicit and intentional 
forms of harm to marginal group members. Whilst the intent here was not to demonise 
Winfrey or to locate transphobia within her as an individual, it is important nonetheless to 
recognise the serious consequences of any form of transphobia, no matter how mundane or 
inclusive the coverage is intended to be. This leads me to suggest that the hyper visibility of 
Beatie within the media both during and since the Oprah interview does not operate to 
provide a safe umbrella for all pregnant trans men (or even for Beatie himself). As Ryan 
(2009) suggests in her discussion of the interview, whilst on the one hand making 
	   21 
experiences such as those of Beatie and his family visible are an important part of 
challenging the norm of the gender-normative nuclear family, it is perhaps too much to 
expect that such visibility will not bring with it further challenges and discrimination. 
Certainly, as Gamson (1999) suggests in his analysis of talk show representations of LGBT 
people, such representations are fraught for their capacity to further marginalise LGBT 
people at the very moment they claim to positively represent our stories.   
The analysis presented in this paper has also shown that whilst attitudinal measures of 
transphobia are important for determining beliefs amongst the general population toward 
trans people, it is also vitally important that we continue to develop our understanding of the 
everyday ways in which transphobia occurs, and perhaps most importantly those that are 
portrayed as inclusive. For as long as it is acceptable to talk about trans people as ‘really’ 
being their natal sex, or only being ‘poor approximations’ of natally-assigned men and 
women, transphobia will continue to occur in mundane ways that are no less violent in their 
outcomes (Riggs and Patterson, 2009). Examining transphobia from the perspective of a non-
trans person must thus be about examining the routine ways in which those of us who are 
non-trans are implicated in the marginalisation of trans people, and how this can be 
challenged by better understanding the rhetorical devices that serve to prop up a normative 
gender order in which trans people are rendered unintelligible. I would suggest, then, that 
what is required is a move away from a research agenda that treats trans people as objects, 
and towards one that treats transphobia and gender normative practices as objects warranting 
attention (as per the early lesbian feminist examination of the construction of heterosexuality; 
see Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1993). Taking on responsibility for examining the operations of 
transphobia and its role in propping up gender binaries (from which non-trans people stand to 
benefit, regardless of our politics) is an important task that must remain on the research 
agenda for the foreseeable future. 
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